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Dear Delegates,

I’m excited to welcome you to PMUNC 2015! My name is Rahul Mehta, and I will be your chair for the United Nations Security Council. First, a little bit about myself; I will be starting my second semester at Princeton in the fall (I took the last semester off to pursue a software engineering job in New York), and will be concentrating in Computer Science with the goal of also completing a certificate in Statistics and Machine Learning. I am from Chicago, IL, and began participating in Model UN during my freshman year of high school.

This will be my fourth PMUNC, and my second as a staffer (I served as a director for Paris Peace Conference last year). This will be my second time serving as a chair, but my first at PMUNC – I’m certain that this will be my most exciting experience running a committee to date. Security Council is also a committee that is very special to me – I took part in it for 6 of the 13 conferences I attended in high school. I look forward to stimulating (and sometimes contentious) debate among all delegates, with the end-goal of resolving two of the most important issues facing the Security Council and the international community as a whole – Standards for Intervention and Fighting the Islamic State.

Our first topic, Standards for Intervention, has become increasingly important in the last several decades as the modern battlefield has shifted from conflicts between large standing armies to combating more fragmented insurgencies or rebel organizations. Much of the corpus of international law that has governed engagement in such conflicts is outdated, and in an era that has seen threats unlike any other the international community has addressed, presents many grey areas. I urge you all to familiarize yourselves with both the relevant pieces of legal doctrine as well as conflicts where such questions have arisen. It is my hope that we can form a cohesive doctrine for intervention that can then be leveraged to address our second topic, combating the Islamic State. This topic is deeply related to several intertwined situations in the Middle East, including the instability caused by the Syrian Civil War as well as the more abstract matter of post-conflict instability (in this case, the insurgency following the US invasion of Iraq). This topic addresses both the practical matters of fighting an organization with a loyal ideological base and a considerable amount of territory as well as the question of uprooting a group steeped in extremism whose credibility is directly tied to their territorial holdings (see Graeme Wood’s excellent article in the Atlantic What ISIS Really Wants for more on this).

In terms of our committee, I will preside over debate between the 5 permanent and 10 rotating members of the Security Council. I love to see ingenious solutions as well as clever applications of parliamentary procedure to advance your country’s position – don’t hesitate to be creative! I hope that this committee will offer a balance of structured debate as well as free-form crises, mirroring the situations that delegates in the Security Council often find themselves in. Please feel free to contact me at rahulmehta@princeton.edu with any questions, or just to say hi (I’d love to chat about the topics, Model UN in general, or anything related to computer science and public policy)! I look forward to meeting you all in November, and best of luck on your research!

Regards,
Rahul Mehta
**Introduction**

The Security Council is one of the six major organs of the United Nations, along with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, and the (now defunct) Trusteeship Council.

Established by Chapter V of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council held its first meeting in January 1946, with five veto-power holding permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and six non-permanent members. A 1965 resolution expanded membership to its current composition, with 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members. Each non-permanent member serves a two-year term with representation from Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America/Caribbean, Western Europe/Other, and Eastern Europe. The current non-permanent members include Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Nigeria (whose terms expire at the end of 2015), Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, and Venezuela (whose terms expire at the end of 2016).

The majority of the Security Council’s authority and power is derived from Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VI addresses the “pacific settlement of disputes” among member states. Any situation which “[endangers] the maintenance of international peace and security”\(^1\) may be referred to the Security Council. In such situations, the Security Council can issue a binding resolution specifying measures to resolve the dispute with consequences for non-compliance (such as sanctions). Additionally, Chapter VII of the Charter specifies measures the Council can take with respect to “breaches of the peace and acts of aggression” in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security”\(^2\). These measures may include more stringent sanctions and the use of military observers or peacekeepers to establish and maintain ceasefires or some other cessation of hostilities.

With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has become a much livelier forum for debate and a committee which is able to take more decisive action; this included addressing conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and North Africa. Additionally, the

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Security Council has dealt with several unique challenges in the 21st century, including the myriad of uprisings in the 2010 Arab Spring, the rogue states of Iran and the DPRK with nuclear aspirations, and separatism and foreign aggression in Eastern Ukraine. Though the Council’s efficacy can be limited at times by the threat of a veto, delegates at this conference should attempt to circumvent deadlock by coming up with creative solutions and maintaining a willingness to compromise. This attitude will be a necessity when addressing our two topics, both of which are contentious matters and issues that are crucial to maintaining stability in the international community.

Rules of Procedure
This committee will run in accordance with PMUNC 2015’s Rules of Procedure, with several additional features unique to Security Council.

In order for a substantive motion to pass (including the passage of a draft resolution or the addition of an amendment), a simple majority (9 members) must vote in favor of the motion without a negative vote from any of the permanent members. If a permanent member votes against a substantive motion, it automatically fails (thus giving rise to the “veto power”). All procedural motions will be decided by a simple majority, unless otherwise specified.

The veto power will not apply to procedural motions.

Additionally, several other procedural motions will be permitted in the Security Council. These are detailed below:

The chair will consider a motion for a round robin in order if seems as if it will be useful for the entire committee to voice his/her opinions successively. Situations like this could include a moderated caucus discussing a particular resolution or directive, or a moderated caucus preceding moving into voting procedure on a draft document. A motion for a round robin should include a speaking time. There are no yields in a round robin, as it functions similarly to a moderated caucus.

The chair will consider a motion for an informal consultation of the whole in order if it seems as if informal debate in a format slightly more structured than an unmoderated caucus will be productive. An informal consultation will have a time limit, and will function as follows; if the committee accepts the motion, the delegation which proposed the informal consultation will be permitted to speak first, for an arbitrary amount of time. After the delegation is finished, they will be permitted to select the next delegation to speak. In practice, parties tend to equitably use the time allotted to them, as opposed to leveraging this to permit only a few delegations to speak.
**Topic A: Standards for Intervention**

**Setting the Stage**
Since its founding following the Second World War, the United Nations has regularly authorized interventions in multiple conflicts to maintain international peace and security. The authority to take such action rests exclusively with the Security Council, as outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter; Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter specifies that “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security,” which may include “action by air, sea, or land forces.” Thus, the Security Council possesses the ability to authorize measures up to and including military action.

The Security Council’s decisions regarding intervention have been controversial at times in the eyes of the international community, citing the sometimes ineffective and slow-moving nature of the body. However, the United Nations remains the only body in the world that can dispatch peacekeeping forces globally and facilitate cooperation on such matters. The UN’s peacekeeping missions span all 6 continents and a variety of different conflicts.

The United Nations Charter, however, does not specify the conditions under which the Security Council may intervene in a given situation; it only stipulates that the intervention is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. In some cases, the prerogative to intervene is clear, but at times can be more nebulous. In the past this has led to inaction on behalf of the Council and resulted in public outcry, anger, and a distrust of the United Nations’ ability to act in a unified manner. The exploration of the circumstances under which the UN should intervene is central to this topic, as is codifying certain benchmarks for conflicts where intervention is the wisest course of action.

**A Brief History of UN Intervention**

The United Nations’ first intervened in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War in the form of a military observer group. The mission was named the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and as the name indicates, was intended to monitor a United Nations-mediated truce between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the former British territory of Palestine. Created by Security Council Resolution 50, the resolution “Instructs the UN mediator…to supervise
the observance of the [truce] provisions, and
decides that they shall be provided with a
sufficient number of military observers.”

This and the UN Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) exemplified
the early stages of UN intervention, which
sought to preserve and verify peace rather
than actively engage in a conflict to enforce
provisions set forth by UN resolutions.

The first instance of an armed
peacekeeping mission was deployed to
address the Suez Crisis of 1956. The UN
Emergency Force I (UNEF I), along with
pressure from the United States and the
Soviet Union, maintained the truce reached
between belligerents Egypt, France, Great
Britain, and Israel. Although armed, UNEF
was the first mission of its kind, it was not
established by the Security Council, but
rather an emergency special session of the
General Assembly. Since it was not
established by a Chapter VII resolution, both
Israel and Egypt had to permit the force’s
entry into their territory.

Though effective in these initial
engagements, UN intervention and indeed
the Security Council in general was
frequently paralyzed by the Cold War. The
United States and the USSR frequently
utilized their veto power, often resulting in
deadlock. However, this did not prevent the
creation of the UN Operation in the Congo
(ONUC), which oversaw the Belgian
withdrawal from their former colony. This
operation was the largest to date, with over
20,000 peacekeepers and support personnel.

Additionally more unarmed observer
missions were created (inherently less
controversial than armed peacekeeping
personnel), including missions in the
Dominican Republic, New Guinea, Yemen,
and Lebanon.

Following the end of the Cold War,
the United Nations saw a large uptick in
peacekeeping operations. Additionally,
several new models of peacekeeping
emerged; additionally, several large-scale
regional conflicts erupted that, in retrospect,
the Security Council was woefully
unprepared for. While observer missions
assisted in Angola, El Salvador, and
Namibia (among others), the UN intervened
following an immensely bloody genocide in
Cambodia at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
UNTAC, the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia, was established, which
effectively turned Cambodia into a

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3 UNSC Resolution 50, S/RES/50,
p?symbol=S/RES/50(1948)
4 Eban and Israeli Foreign Policy –
Diplomacy, War, and Disengagement,
Michael Brecher, pp. 104.
5 Yearbook of International Humanitarian
Law - 2003, Volume 6; Volume 2003,
Timothy McCormack and Avril McDonald,
pp. 201
temporary UN protectorate. Although the success of the mission is still questioned, this introduced a new model of peacekeeping that has extended to several other situations.

Additionally, this post-Cold War period saw two horrific conflicts – the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resulting conflicts in the Balkans, and the Rwandan Genocide. In both situations, political instability exacerbated by ethnic tensions led to large-scale war, ethnic cleansing, and other strife. In the former Yugoslavia, the death of Marshall Josip Broz Tito led to the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Serbia, among other nations. As the breakup had occurred along predominantly ethnic lines (specifically Croat, Bosnian, Serbian, and Albanian), tensions escalated eventually leading to armed conflict in these regions. With this came ethnic cleansing, conducted by parties from all ethnic groups, in an attempt to rid their respective states of other peoples. Additionally, this was one of the first conflicts on the international stage in which non-state military actors played a prominent role (largely in the form of forces representing self-declared but internationally unrecognized governments), such as the forces under General Ratko Mladic of Republika Srpska (now a constituent republic of Bosnia). This further complicated the matter, which when combined with a reticence on behalf of the international community to intervene, led to large-scale loss of life. Despite the United Nations dispatching the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the region in an attempt to enforce multiple Security Council resolutions calling for a cessation to the violence, the conflict continued. In a tragic event that undermined that resulted in the deaths of more than 8,000 civilians (primarily women and children), Republika Srpska forces breached a designated “safe-zone” at Srebrenica and conducted the massacre; with a force strength of over 5,000, they outnumbered the UN forces nearly 5 to 1, and by the end of their operations, had taken over 50 peacekeepers hostage. Provided with unclear rules of engagement and a staggeringly smaller force contingent, the peacekeepers were unable to prevent the massacre from occurring. The debate amongst Security Council members limited the force size, while the majority of international parties refused throughout the debate to classify the conflict as a “genocide,” a demarcation that would have made the process for dispatching a sufficient peacekeeping force an easier task. In fact, it was only in 2007 that the International Court

8 Ibid.
of Justice officially ruled the killings in Srebrenica a genocide.⁹

As the Security Council transitioned into the 21ˢᵗ Century, new situations have presented themselves to the Security Council in the context of intervention. The Council has debated the issue of intervention in Iraq in 2002, ¹⁰ which brought about the first “coalition of the willing” headed by the United States and its allies. Although the language was never explicitly passed by the Security Council, this conflict provides a perspective on Security Council deliberations; feeling that the actions of the UNSC were moving too slowly and were untenable for the current situation, the American government acted as it saw fit and launched the invasion under its own interpretation of past Security Council resolutions. Additionally, many more missions were launched on the African continent, including missions to bring about an end to the crisis in Darfur and the conflict within (the former) Sudan. The conflict in Darfur, another situation where there was initial international hesitation to label the conflict a genocide, saw the first manifestation of a new concept of peacekeeping – a UN/regional organization hybrid. The mission, UNAMID (the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur), was established by resolution 1769 in June 2007 to bring about the end of the ethnic cleansing taking place against the predominantly Christian population in the oil-rich south of Sudan.¹¹ The hybrid nature of the mission permitted some of the implementation responsibilities to fall to the African Union, while oversight and overall policy remained with the Security Council. The power for the Security Council to delegate such tasks to a regional organization is derived from Chapter 53 of the UN Charter, which stipulates “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”¹² Another example of Security Council action under the power of Article 53 was the 2011 intervention in Libya against the government of Muammar Gaddafi; resolution 1973 authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to enforce a no-fly zone over the Libyan Arab Republic.¹³ Other missions in recent

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¹⁰ Security Council Resolution 1441, S/RES/1441,
¹¹ Security Council Resolution 1769, S/RES/1769
years include engagements in Mali, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, and Kosovo.

When considering a framework for defining standards for intervention, it is first crucial to understand the relevant aspects of international law that such a framework must encapsulate. This committee should be familiar with the overarching points of all of these aspects of international law and should reference them in any resolution passed on the topic. The key points in any potential framework discussed in this session of the Security Council should have a well-founded basis in one of these international legal principles. Many of these principles or interpretations thereof can lead to contentious debate, but it is important to ensure that any proposed solution is grounded in the following;

**Humanitarian Intervention**

One of the most integral aspects of intervention is *humanitarian intervention* – a concept that has led to a great deal of controversy over the years. The United Nations and individual states alike have struggled with balancing the benefits of humanitarian intervention with its downsides, and this will be a central aspect of our debate.

To delve into this concept, we must first define it; J. L. Holzgrefe, Professor of Political Science at Duke University defines it to be “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”\(^{14}\) This is a fairly comprehensive definition, with the one potential pitfall of

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\(^{14}\) The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, J.L. Holzgrefe, part of Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, p. 18
limiting it to instances where the state in which the action to take place refuses entry to external forces. However, this certainly captures the essence of the concept. Humanitarian intervention can encompass many different engagements where the core mission is to protect civilians and prevent large scale loss of life.

The legality of humanitarian intervention, however noble the motives may be, is still murky. No documented treaty or law explicitly authorizes intervention for purely humanitarian purposes. However, the Security Council may dispatch a peacekeeping operation that encompasses the mission of protecting civilians if it deems it necessary. Such missions include interventions in Sudan during the conflict in Darfur, in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Many states or groups of states take place in humanitarian intervention missions as well. Such missions include the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Operation Allied Force) to stop human rights abuses in Kosovo at the hands of Serbian militias, as well as Operation Provide Comfort, in which the United States and its allies provided protection for and delivered aid to the displaced Kurdish population in Northern Iraq following the first Gulf War. While there may not be an explicit legal basis for conducting humanitarian intervention, many of the human rights abuses that give rise to situations requiring humanitarian intervention are addressed in a multitude of treaties. Several of these documents have aided the Security Council in authorizing peacekeeping missions as well as led to prosecution of responsible parties at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The first of these documents is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10th, 1948. This document defines “fundamental freedoms” in its 30 articles, which encompass the freedom to assemble peaceably to banning slavery to equality before the law and in the eyes of the government. Though not a treaty officially ratified by any of the member states, its definitions are a suitable means of benchmarking a situation that may necessitate intervention.

Additionally, two treaties in particular codify and address three of the most important factors when deciding whether or not to intervene humanitarian purposes; crimes against humanity, war

http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/mar/27/balkans
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort_2.htm

Ibid.
crimes, and genocide. The first of these is colloquially known as the “Genocide Convention” is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Entering into force January 12th, 1951, it defines genocide in Article 2 as an act or acts:

“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births in the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”19

In addition, either committing or conspiring to commit the aforementioned acts is punishable under the convention. The term genocide, however, is quite controversial, with the Security Council often hesitating to label a conflict as such. For example, both the ethnic cleansing that took place in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda lacked the official classification from the Security Council. Moreover, the Darfur conflict lacked the label from the United Nations, albeit receiving it from a number of governments.20

A perhaps easier mechanism for considering conflicts could be derived from Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, which established the first permanent international court where war crimes and crimes against humanity could be prosecuted.21 Article 6 provides a similar consideration of genocide as the 1951 Genocide Convention, but articles 7 and 8 provide significantly more options. Article 7 defines Crimes against Humanity as “a systematic or widespread attack directed against any civilian population,” and War Crimes as “grave breaches” of the Geneva Convention, as well as a collection of other “serious violations.”22

With this legal foundation, delegates should consider which aspects of these treaties merit further consideration when defining a set of standards for intervention. Such considerations should also include which violations are significantly greater in severity and what sorts of actions are prudent for the Security Council to take.

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21 http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aef7f-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
22 Ibid.
Non-State Actors

Another aspect that delegates should consider in this debate is the presence of non-state actors in a conflict. In many recent situations, the modern battlefield has shifted to include multiple non-state actors including terrorist groups, insurgencies or separatist movements, and many more. These non-state actors often contribute to political upheaval greatly and also can commit some of the worst atrocities against civilians. Thus, non-state actors involved in domestic or cross-border conflicts merit special consideration by the Security Council.

Non-state actors often act in unpredictable ways, and can possess radical ideological or political beliefs. Additionally, non-state actors operating within the borders of a state can lead to disagreement with regards to the intervening party (the domestic government or an international force). When considering how the presence of non-state actors affects the standards for intervention in a conflict, delegates should think of them in these distilled categories (taken from Phil Williams’ classification of violent non-state actors),\(^{23}\)

1. Warlords - Individuals able to exercise control over certain specific territory, in large part through their military power and command of private military forces. Participate in the global economic system, engaging in one or more forms of illicit or informal economy, and challenge, privatize or supplement the state functions, resources and instruments on their territories, often using coercion.

2. Militias - An irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state, members often coming from lower classes and drawn/coerced with access to money, resources, power and/or security. Can represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan or other communal groups and they may operate under the auspices of a factional leader, clan or ethnic group. Also can be on own after the dissolution of the states’ forces, particularly prevalent where particular factions or religious groups feel that they do not receive adequate protection from the state and fill the absence of effective national, provincial, or local security institutions.

3. Paramilitary forces - An irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state, members often coming from lower classes and drawn/coerced with access to money, resources, power and/or security. Can represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan or other communal groups.

and they may operate under the auspices of a factional leader, clan or ethnic group. Also can be on own after the dissolution of the states’ forces, particularly prevalent where particular factions or religious groups feel that they do not receive adequate protection from the state and fill the absence of effective national, provincial, or local security institutions.

4. Insurgencies - Organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government (in some cases, however, an insurgent's goals may be more limited, e.g. intention to break away from government control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious territorial bounds). Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve different actors with various aims, loosely connected in networks. May also utilize terrorist techniques, though not exclusively.

5. Terrorist organizations – a group that uses acts of terror to either influence an international governmental organization, government, or a populace to enforce particular conditions. Typically, the use or threat of force is made for the purpose of advancing a political religious or ideological cause.

Within these categories, delegates should begin to think about how standards for intervention may differ or remain the same amongst them, and additionally what strategies or types of intervention would be best to combat these groups.

The Responsibility to Protect

Another aspect to consider within intervention is the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P. Though, again, not official law in the form of a treaty or binding Security Council resolution, this doctrine represents a consensus formed by a large majority of member nations, and is one of the guiding principles for a multitude of nations on matters of intervention. Though no nation has formally adopted a doctrine of intervention solely for humanitarian purposes, this is as close as it comes in this regard.

The United Nations General Assembly, in its 2005 World Summit, adopted a resolution (albeit non-binding) that expressed the core sentiments of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The key points are outlined below;

“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes,
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.”

Furthermore, the resolution goes on to state that “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” These points are encompassed in the “three pillars” of the Responsibility to Protect, which consist of (1) the state carries responsibility for protecting their citizens from genocide, war crimes, etc., (2) the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in fulfilling the previous point, and (3) the international community has a responsibility to utilize diplomatic, humanitarian and other means from protecting populations from the aforementioned crimes.

Though contentious, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine represents a significant portion of member states and should be thought of as an accepted, yet not legally supported standard for intervention in certain situations. Delegates should consider the implications of extending R2P to a codified legal document (in the form of a Security Council resolution), and how that could potentially alter the discussion surrounding intervention in this forum.

Another aspect that delegates will need to navigate is resolving discrepancies between the concepts of R2P and national sovereignty; this has been one of the biggest blockers of wide-scale adoption of the doctrine, and will be a critical aspect of this committee’s debate.

## Intervention and Regional Organizations

Although this committee will indeed focus on the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations and Security Council doctrine for future interventions, regional organizations have taken a significant role in peacekeeping and intervention operations, both authorized and unauthorized by the United Nations. An important aspect of this topic will consist of determining when (and if at all) it is prudent for regional organizations to intervene in a conflict, and under what conditions they should do so.

The legal basis for this type of action is derived from Chapter VIII, namely Article 53, which states that “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize

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25 Ibid.
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…26 The authority granted under this article of the charter allows the Security Council to empower regional organizations to act on its behalf, if the situation is fitting. However, regional intervention has often been controversial among member states, and is something that the Security Council should consider carefully when debating this issue.

The Security Council has frequently acted under Article 53 to authorize regional interventions. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established multiple peacekeeping operations in the region both for quelling turmoil resulting from political unrest as well as to address humanitarian issues. For example, ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, has conducted missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia for the purposes of preventing a resurgence in armed conflict following ethnic cleansing and civil war in these areas.27 ECOMOG has been active in these regions for quite some time under Article 53 authorization, and is an integral part of the United Nations’ efforts in these regions. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has dispatched multiple operations (both diplomatic and otherwise) in Central Europe as well as the former Soviet Bloc under the auspices of the Security Council.28 Even in the current situation in Ukraine, the OSCE has proven to be a valuable party as an interlocutor in the ongoing discussion regarding a diplomatic solution to the geopolitical crisis that has erupted there.29

Additionally, states and regional actors have taken action outside of UNSC authorization. A prime example is the United States’ intervention in Iraq in 2002. Although the debate of biological and chemical weapons and the possibility of Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction was a key agenda item in the Security Council for quite some time, the United States and its’ so-called “coalition of the willing” (consisting primarily of NATO members) launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although Iraq was found to be in a “material breach of its obligations” to eliminate facilities capable of producing

27 Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Organizations Under the Charter of the United Nations, Kho Cha
28 Ibid.
WMDs pursuant to Resolution 1441\(^{30}\), the operation launched by the United States did not receive proper Chapter VII authorization from the UNSC.

Although Article 53 can authorize external parties to act under the auspices of the UNSC, delegates should be careful when determining the types of situations under regional organizations should be the enforcing party of any Security Council resolution under Chapters VI or VII. Certainly regional organizations are the right avenue to pursue given certain types of conflicts, but where should the UNSC draw the line, and additionally, where should the UNSC determine that regional intervention is not the appropriate course of action and that a broader debate regarding the deployment of UN Peacekeepers or Military Observers take place?

**National Sovereignty**

Even though certain situations may warrant intervention, one sticking point among member states on the Security Council when discussing potential operations is the maintenance of national sovereignty. The term was introduced in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and was the first recognition in any international law that states had a right to maintain their sovereignty and prevent any illegal breaches or intrusions. The UN Charter recognizes this as well, with certain exceptions in Chapter VII (i.e. to maintain international peace and security).

So does intervention (and in particular) humanitarian intervention violate national sovereignty? In certain situations it does not (for example, with UNSC authorization), but in others it does. However, states have chosen to forgo this principle in order to intervene in a situation where the Security Council has either not acted or is deadlocked. Such missions can be seen as illegal in these circumstances, and understandably, create a great deal of controversy in the international community.

Another principle delegates should consider is the right of self-defense, which is specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. States, if attacked, may act either individually or collectively in self-defense until the United Nations takes relevant measures to restore peace and security. However, this language has often been abused and stretched to its limits – the war in Iraq is a prime example of the notion of “preemptive self-defense,” one which is a useful political maneuver but is generally not accepted in the realm of international law. Though a useful technique, the right to self-defense in the context of the Charter does not extend to a state’s domestic affairs;

thus, it is near impossible to use this justification for intervening in a situation where either the state or non-state actors operating within its borders are committing crimes against civilians or war crimes.

The notion of National Sovereignty is one that is crucial to understanding this topic, and delegates will have to navigate this contentious issue in order to arrive at a framework for intervention standards. Delegates should consider situations where the Security Council should authorize peacekeeping missions for purely internal as well as cross-border conflicts, as well as types or structures of missions that could be more easily accepted.

Proposed Solutions and Questions to Answer

Standardization of Intervention Criterion

As should be evident from the above discussion of many successful and failed interventions on behalf of the UNSC, delegates should focus on determining what criterion is important for the UNSC to decide that intervention is necessary. Additionally, delegates should be wary of over-indexing on particular situations and focusing on the state of the world today, and how it might affect the committee’s credibility.

The major goal of this topic is to produce a framework that the entirety of the council can accept as both a norm as well as a codified resolution regarding intervention. While this is complicated and may indeed seem difficult given the differing and sometimes opposing bloc positions on this topic, delegates should consider circumstances under which a majority of conditions in relevant international documents are met that allow the situation to be classified as either a gross violation of human rights, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.

Regional Intervention

As discussed above, when executed correctly, utilizing regional bodies can take a significant burden off the Security Council from an operational standpoint while still retaining the body’s accountability for the mission’s success or failure. An important question for delegates is determining when regional organizations are the appropriate body to execute a peacekeeping mission while maintaining a level of accountability to the UNSC and other bodies. While the success stories are many, so are the failures. Delegates must determine a means to strike a balance between handing off mission responsibility to external parties and weighing the risks of unilateral intervention by certain parties. By reevaluating some of the norms the Security Council has adhered to in the past, illegal or unauthorized
interventions can be prevented and the Security Council can focus on maintaining peace without the added imbalance of unilateral or multilateral actions undermining the body’s authority.

Mission Accountability and Oversight

Another aspect that delegates should consider is accountability and oversight of peacekeepers that are deployed. Peacekeeping missions, though tasked with a fundamentally good mission, can err at times. For example, during their intervention in Mali to suppress the Tuareg uprising, a group of French soldiers were charged with sexually assaulting a local woman.\(^{31}\) These type of stories were frequent from many peacekeeping missions, and resulted in anger and lowered confidence in the public’s eyes. When focusing on a resolution for this topic, delegates should also think about existing oversight mechanisms within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and how they could be revised or updated.

Additionally, another aspect that should be considered is oversight in the context of adherence to the mission mandate. Often times, states on the Security Council are reluctant to vote for a resolution authorizing intervention in a conflict because they feel that it would be easy for an intervening party to extend beyond their mandate. An example cited by the Russian Federation was the 2011 NATO intervention in the Libyan Arab Republic. Security Council resolution 1973 authorized NATO to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, yet, as Russia argues, they became the de-facto air force of the rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi’s government. This type of “mission creep” has led to wariness by certain states of the peacekeeping process and adds a significant amount of friction subsequently when attempting to deploy forces.

Prosecution and State/Individual Responsibility

A final category delegates should think about for this topic is both establishing responsibility for and prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity post-intervention. Once the Security Council has made the determination to intervene, responsibility for acts that have taken place need to be attributed to the correct parties for prosecution to take place. These may be a state, group of states, or individuals. There are certain grey areas here that delegates will need to navigate; for example, states are clearly responsible for crimes committed against another state or their own civilians, but in the context of a state working in concert with a non-state actor (much like the Janjaweed militias sponsored by Omar al-

\(^{31}\) [citation needed]
Bashir’s government in Darfur) it becomes less clear. There are some resources that exist as a starting point – an important document here is the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of State Responsibility, which lays out many of the fundamental principles of the issue.

Moreover, prosecution is another important aspect of both attributing responsibility and addressing violations that may have occurred. The establishment in 2002 of the International Criminal Court helped this aspect greatly, although extradition and indictment is still an extremely difficult process. The Security Council or states can refer situations to the Office of the Prosecutor to be examined and investigated, yet there is no unified story around the enforcement of ICC indictments or extradition to The Hague. Delegates should consider as well standards and frameworks for states emerging from an intervention, and attempt to unify practices surrounding extradition and state compliance with the ICC.
Topic B: Fighting the Islamic State

Setting the Stage

The current situation in the Middle East is one of the highest priorities for the Security Council. Instability and strife have wracked the region, and much of the turmoil can be attributed to the Islamic State (IS). The Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria - ISIS) draws its roots back to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and currently holds territory across Syria and Iraq with an estimated 10,000,000 people residing within their territory.\(^\text{32}\)

The Islamic State made headlines earlier this year when it proclaimed itself as a caliphate in June 2014, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph. Following a series of territorial gains, ISIS swept through Syria and parts of Iraq, taking Mosul, Tikrit, and other strategic locations and coming within 16 miles of the Baghdad airport.\(^\text{33}\) This prompted the mobilization of a large international effort and the redeployment of American forces to Iraq following a near-full withdrawal of American military forces the year before. Currently the Islamic State and its enemies, both Arab and otherwise,

\[\text{are locked in a brutal struggle with minor gains on each side, but neither side achieving full dominance to swing the conflict one direction or another. It is up to this committee to evaluate the current situation and take action on a number of different fronts to help halt ISIS’ territorial gains and enduring brutality.}\]

A Brief History of the Islamic State

The Islamic State today is far from its roots in the Iraqi insurgency following the invasion by the United States-led coalition. The deposition of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party in 2003 and the subsequent power vacuum that was created gave rise to a multitude of insurgent groups from various factions and further exacerbated tensions between Sunnis and Shias in the region.

The beginnings of ISIS can be traced back to al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was originally founded under the name Jama‘at al-Tawhidw‘al-Jihad by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi.\(^\text{34}\) That same year, he pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, officially creating AQI. However, the original AQI did not fare extremely well in the years following the invasion of relative stability in Iraq; rather, the surge of Coalition forces in 2007 coupled with so-called “Awakening” councils (coalition-sponsored groups of local tribal and community leaders) denied

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\(^{32}\) \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/13/us-mideast-crisis-syria-icrc-idUSKB2N0M921N20150313}

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) \url{http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqi.html}
AQI safe-haven and nearly led to its extinction.\textsuperscript{35} Although the group continued to conduct high-profile attacks from 2008-2010, senior leaders Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi were killed in April 2010 in a joint US-Iraqi raid on their safe house.\textsuperscript{36}

Following Abu Umar’s death, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’ current leader, took the helm of the organization. Immediately, Abu Bakr declared that the (then-called) Islamic State in Iraq was the beginning of a caliphate with himself as the caliph. By taking the title, “al-Baghdadi has declared himself the chief imam and political and military leader of all Muslims.”\textsuperscript{37} However, despite the group’s origins in Iraq, the first major opportunity for territorial gains in fact came about from the civil war raging in Iraq’s next-door neighbor, Syria. The Syrian Civil War, a product of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, led to a conflict between forces loyal to current president Bashar al-Assad and his primarily Alawi ruling group and the predominantly Sunni majority.\textsuperscript{38} However, an inability to form a cohesive opposition group among the rebels led to an increasingly fractured effort to unseat the Assad government despite significant gains in the Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Furthermore, the addition of radical Islamic elements in the rebellion (initially in the form of al-Qaeda affiliate the al-Nusra Front and the Muslim Brotherhood) complicated the question of international aid to the rebellion to help overthrow Assad. While the major “secular” rebel element, the Free Syrian Army, received funding authorization from the White House and other Western governments, many of its units defected to al-Nusra and later ISIS.\textsuperscript{39}

2014 saw the beginning of a major ISIS offensive that led to massive territorial gains in both Iraq and Syria. In early June, ISIS forces seized Tikrit (the birthplace of Saddam Hussein), as well as the strategic city of Mosul, which placed them within striking distance of Baghdad. After significant territorial gains in Syria as well, ISIS militants captured the city of Sinjar, which was home to a minority known as the Yazidis. Practicing a religion with roots in Assyrian and Mesopotamian beliefs, they were often the targets of sectarian violence. However, following the city’s capture, militants killed over 5,000 Yazidi men and

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8630213.stm
\textsuperscript{37} http://theweek.com/articles/443835/abu-bakr-albaghdadi-man-who-caliph
\textsuperscript{38} http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/understanding-syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989/
\textsuperscript{39} http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/asia/item/16550-what-is-the-obama-backed-free-syrian-army
sold countless women into slavery.\textsuperscript{40} In addition, over 50,000 of the 200,000 refugees became stranded atop the mountains surrounding Sinjar. During this crisis, President Barack Obama authorized limited airstrikes to assist the Kurdish Peshmerga forces (the de-facto armed forces of Iraqi Kurdistan) near the Kurdish city Erbil.

Following the initial success of limited air engagement, President Obama announced the creation of a coalition including the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Denmark.\textsuperscript{41} One of the first actions taken by the newly-created coalition is to bomb ISIS’ claimed capital, the city of Raqqa in northern Syria. Additionally, an airstrike in November on Mosul reportedly severely injured al-Baghdadi. December and early 2015 saw a slight shift in the tide of the conflict, with Kurdish forces aided by US-led airstrikes pushed ISIS forces out of the Sinjar region along the Iraq-Syria border. Another victory for the Kurdish forces occurred when they successfully pushed ISIS forces out of the Syrian border town of Kobani after a months-long stalemate. Continuing with the turning tide, the US-led coalition began a series of airstrikes over Tikrit and Mosul which led to the liberation of Tikrit in early April. However, a stalemate has been reached near Mosul, despite the fact that a US-Iraqi offensive had been planned for the end of the summer.\textsuperscript{42}

**What is the Islamic State?**

**Leadership and Organization**

Despite its initially fractured leadership structure and condition during its early days as AQI, the Islamic State now possesses a more sophisticated leadership structure that begins to loosely resemble that of a state. Currently, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the supreme leader of IS, and as caliph, has absolute authority over all Muslims and other individuals in ISIS-controlled territory. Additionally, given the nature of their territorial holdings being concentrated to Iraq and Syria, Baghdadi relies heavily on two deputies, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani and Abu Ali al-Anbari for managing operations in Iraq and Syria respectively. Given the injuries he sustained during a US-led airstrike, it is rumored that the day-to-day operations of ISIS are in fact being managed by his deputies and cabinet.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may]
A high-level overview of ISIS leadership (source: CNN)

Each region within Iraq and Syria has a governor, each of which report to the respective councils listed below. Notable ones are the Leadership, Military, Financial, and Fighters Assistance Councils, each of which are key to some of the proposed actions detailed later in this packet.

Beliefs and Ideology

The Islamic State maintains a belief system that is, at its core, a radical and very literal interpretation of the Koran from the 7th century AD. In an in-depth investigation of the ideological and political roots for ISIS’ actions, journalist Graeme Wood identified and clearly outlined some of their basic reasoning; that ISIS’ actions clearly follow a 7th century interpretation of Islamic religious texts that follow a path to bringing about the apocalypse and the Day of Judgment. Though this interpretation might be a little controversial, it certainly serves to clarify the ISIS ideology.

Examining ISIS’ actions through this lens, a much clearer picture emerges. To understand the organization, we must return to the literal interpretation that they are following. Herein lies one of the largest

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/
differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda – while al-Qaeda evolved into a splintered group with many autonomous cells operating worldwide, the Islamic State instead is tied to its territorial holdings. Part of a caliphate’s “holy mission,” under this particular interpretation, is to increase its territory. Thus, ISIS’ legitimacy in the eyes of its most ideologically devoted supporters are tied directly to its territorial holdings.\(^45\)

While this ideological basis may seem bizarre and frankly quite impractical (returning the world to a seventh-century legal environment), it is reflected quite directly in the language used by the Islamic State in recruiting materials. In a message published by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the chief spokesperson of the Islamic State, he calls for Muslims in the Western world “to find an infidel and “smash his head with a rock,” poison him, run him over with a car, or “destroy his crops.”\(^46\) Indeed, these biblical-sounding punishments make more sense with the previous context, though they also possess an interesting juxtaposition with more modern notions.

Ideological following is crucial to ISIS’ continuation, to the degree that a very explicit interpretation of Sharia Law is administered in the provinces they control. Known as the hisbah, or religious police, this group enforces Sharia in day-to-day aspects of life. In footage shot undercover by VICE News in the ISIS capital of Raqqa, hisbah officials are seen stopping a man because his wife’s veil did not conform to Sharia fashion, examining the prices of beef versus lamb meat in a store, and ensuring that no food is consumed during daylight hours during Ramadan.\(^47\) The granularity of enforcement while engaged in so many external conflicts sheds some light on the ideological importance of maintaining this interpretation of the Koran, and provides an insight into how the world and this committee can approach dismantling an organization that has become entrenched in a large swath of territory.

**Territorial Holdings**

Once controlling an area larger than that of the United Kingdom, ISIS’ current territorial holdings have been a state of flux. Following the US-led coalition’s battery of airstrikes, coupled with advances by the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Islamic State’s territorial holdings have declined by slightly less than 10%, with losses both in the southern zones of their territory by the Iraqi military (who have recaptured Tikrit, Haditha, and the area

\(^45\) Ibid.

\(^46\) Ibid.

\(^47\) [https://news.vice.com/video/the-islamic-state-part-3](https://news.vice.com/video/the-islamic-state-part-3)
near the Mosul dam), as well as by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, who have seized several strategic locations on the road to the IS capital city, Raqqa.  

Additionally, after pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in early 2015, Boko Haram’s territorial holdings in Africa including parts of Nigeria and bordering nations Cameroon and Chad have now become the Islamic State’s “West Africa Province” (referred to by ISIS as Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya). Additionally, Chechen militants in the North Caucasus (specifically in Dagestan) switched their allegiance to ISIS, which now also purportedly possesses a “North Caucasus Province” (Wilayat Qawqaz) led by Chechen militant Rustam Asildarov.

Important Actors in the Situation

State Actors

- Syrian Arab Republic – following the beginning of the 2011 Civil War, Syria has been unstable and in a constant state of conflict. The Islamic State exploited this, and has massively grown their territorial holdings in Syria since operations began in 2013. However, the tide of the battle in Syria is turning, and president Bashar al-Assad deeply wants to remove IS elements from the nation. However, the United States and other western powers will not cooperate with Syrian governmental elements at all in attempting to oust ISIS.

- Iraq – following Nouri al-Malaki’s resignation after arguably inciting sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias, Haider al-Abadi became Prime Minister. A moderate seeking to mend sectarian schisms, al-Abadi’s government has secured $1.5 billion in US aid and secured the continuation of F-16 fighters, which had previously been halted. With enhanced cooperation with the United States, Iraq’s army has made territorial gains against ISIS. However, further cooperation will be necessary in order to

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49 http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/12/middleeast/isis-boko-haram/
50 http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-declares-governorate-russia%E2%80%99s-north-caucus-region
51 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-01-16/mending-iraq
secure the remainder of Iraq’s territory and reclaim it from ISIS.

- Turkey – as a part of the US-led coalition, Turkey supports western efforts to oust ISIS from Syria and Iraq. Recently, after formally declaring war on ISIS in late 2014, Turkey has begun airstrikes of their own while also permitting the United States to launch airstrikes from their bases. This type of cooperation among regional actors is critical to curtailing the ISIS threat.

- United States and other allies – the United States and its western and middle-eastern coalition have significantly helped the Iraqi and Kurdish forces on the ground with close air support, weapons, and training. However, there has been a contentious debate both in the US as well as within their allies’ domestic governments regarding any coalition boots on the ground in the situation. Currently, the US and its allies will not place any military forces on the ground – however, given the nature of the situation this could easily change.

**Non-State Actors**

- Al Qaeda – after disavowing all ties with the Islamic State, al-Qaeda’s remaining forces in Syria fight both against ISIS and the Syrian government. As a significant element of the counter-Assad movement, al-Qaeda’s forces still are a force to be reckoned with in the Syrian conflict. However, their offensive military position is not nearly as strong as that of the Islamic State. In the conflict against the Islamic State, al-Qaeda is not a party that most nations would consider working with, but may organically damage IS’ position anyways.

- Kurdish Peshmerga – the Kurdish People’s Protection Forces, also known as the YPG or Peshmerga, is the de-facto military of the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq and elsewhere. The Peshmerga have been instrumental in beating back the Islamic state, and have liberated thousands from ISIS control. However, they are still in deep need of funds, which the US and its allies have pledged to them – a continuation of the discussion surrounding both aid and training of YPG forces will be critical to ensure cooperation between Coalition, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces.

- Shia Muslim and other Militias – these militias also are operating within Iraq and Syria fighting against ISIS in an ad-hoc manner. These militias are often comprised of local tribesman or religious/ethnic sects, and with the change in the Iraqi government, should
be encouraged to join the growing numbers of the Iraqi army in order to unify efforts to remove ISIS from Iraq. However, this may prove to be controversial, since some of these militias include groups that could have been disenfranchised during Nouri al-Malaki’s government. Thus, this committee should carefully evaluate these groups and assist Iraq in planning an integration into their armed forces.

**Relevant Resolutions**

Apart from the Security Council’s myriad of resolutions regarding terrorism, the financing of terrorism and other issues, the Security Council has passed only 4 distinct resolutions regarding the ISIS threat to stability in the region. Following the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq and the subsequent drawdown of forces, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq in 2003 with Resolution 1500. This force was a non-military group which was tasked with providing assistance for the implementation of international accords regarding Iraq, protecting vital institutions and United Nations personnel, and assisting the Iraqi government with capacity building in political institutions.\(^52\)

Specifically regarding the ISIS matter, the Security Council has extended UNAMI’s mandate through mid-2016, and adopted several other resolutions (2110, 2169, 2170, 2178, and 2199) which addressed various facets of the issue. Specifically citing the alarming increase in foreign fighters (which at the time of the resolution totaled 13,000 new recruits that year from abroad), the Security Council passed Resolution 2170, which added known recruiters and facilitators to the list for the al-Qaeda sanctions regime (including targeted asset freezes and monitoring), as well as 2178 which expanded the UN counterterrorism framework to handle this new paradigm for foreign fighters. Additionally, Resolution 2199 targeted the complex financing network that the Islamic State has assembled, including illicit oil sales through third parties and extortion via kidnapping.\(^53\)

**Addressing the ISIS Threat**

Though in no way a conclusive list of the solutions that the committee should consider, delegates should especially be aware of these potential areas that the United Nations can assist in intervening in the conflict. One warning – though the committee can take whichever path(s) of action it deems necessary, a full-scale

\(^52\) [https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/resolutions/res1500.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/resolutions/res1500.pdf)

\(^53\) [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2199.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2199.pdf)
assault on ISIS forces is likely out of the question. However, the United Nations can engage on multiple other paths towards a resolution of the conflict, some of which are outlined below.

**Armed intervention**

The United Nations has not said that it will (at least in the near future) consider authorizing a mission to attack ISIS. However, the United Nations has not objected to the Western coalition’s intervention in Iraq and Syria, but has in fact remained silent on the issue. A potential reason for this is that nations such as Russia and China may not agree with a large-scale Western intervention in the region, and the United States and its allies would not like to see a potential veto of a Security Council resolution that could undermine the legitimacy of its efforts.

The Security Council, hypothetically, could retroactively authorize the mission under the auspices of Article 53 of the UN Charter, which would both lend a wider range of international support to the mission as well as offer a wider degree of agencies that could assist in both coordination and aid delivery.

**Materially supporting anti-ISIS parties**

Despite recent efforts by the United States and its allies to supply parties fighting ISIS, there is still a large degree of reluctance to extend beyond the current capacity of small arms and non-lethal aid. The United States has cited multiple reasons for this, the most important being that they do not want arms to fall into wrong hands. US aid convoys have delivered directly to Erbil, the Kurdish capital city; however, Kurdish forces still complain of being grossly under-armed. The reasoning for this is twofold; following the capture of advanced weaponry given to the Iraqi army by ISIS, the US does not want to introduce more advanced technology into the theater. Additionally, aware of Iraqi-Kurdish and European-Kurdish tensions, the world is very careful of the state of armament of the Kurdish forces, who until only recently were designated a terrorist organization by the United States and its allies.54

Another issue that must be addressed is the disparity between the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government) forces and the YPG (Kurdish Peoples Protection Unit) – the YPG, despite fewer sophisticated weapons, has proven to be more effective at taking the fight to ISIS than the KRG. The United Nations can assist in this matter by both delineating a set of criterion for these groups to meet before they can begin to receive advanced armaments (including a set of structural parameters as well as built-in accountability for the weapons delivered). This committee should consider these as a first step, and then extend that into a strategy for delivering aid to these groups. Additionally, training regimes such as the one coalition forces are undertaking with the Iraqi military should also be considered for non-state actors that have proven to be loyal to the anti-ISIS effort.

Curtailing foreign fighters

Another incredibly important issue in curtailing ISIS’ territorial advances is limiting their recruitment of foreign fighters. Estimates put the current count of ISIS’ foreign ranks at a little under 21,000 since the conflict began, including large contingents from the Arab world as well as Western Europe.

The Security Council already has passed measures to curtail this influx of foreign fighters in Resolution 2178, but certainly more can be done. One approach that can be taken is to help coordination between regional, domestic, and international counterterrorism bodies to help stem the flow of foreign fighters to the region. Another approach to this issue is targeting the Islamic State’s propaganda machine, in which the ISIS mission and other pieces of information are disseminated to vulnerable groups for recruitment.
The Security Council can work with national governments to develop a comprehensive strategy for mitigating this other important factor.

**Financial monitoring**

The Islamic State is nothing without its financing sources. Initially gaining financial momentum by looting the cities it took over, ISIS now operates a diverse funding system drawing from multiple sources. Scholars estimate that “The Islamic State largely generates its own funds, and as its territorial reach expands so does its access to resources. Their control over oil fields in Northern Iraq brings in an estimated $2 million a day, raised through smuggling the oil across the borders with Iran and Turkey.”

However, the problem of oil smuggling from Iraq is nothing new. Oil is sold through 3rd party intermediaries, so the parties that are the recipients of illicit oil are none the wiser. Enhanced financial monitoring capabilities can assist nations and the Security Council in halting this source of revenue for ISIS. While many bodies exist pursuant to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, enhanced cooperation and information-sharing can help alleviate this issue. Delegates should also examine strategies utilized by regional organizations and domestic governments for halting the trade of illicit oil, as well as other commodities. Another source of revenue for ISIS are illicit antiquities; again, this is not a new concept for the conflicts in Iraq over the last two decades, but enhanced financial monitoring can again assist in curtailing this.

Finally, European hostages are purportedly worth “$3 million USD each,” so it is unsurprising that kidnapping and extortion are another source of revenue. In considering these aspects, delegates should review existing strategies that have succeeded and failed, and bring together a compilation of methods that can comprehensively address this facet of the topic.

**Humanitarian initiatives and aid coordination**

Finally, given the nature of this conflict, hundreds of thousands if not millions have been displaced (3 million have been reported displaced in Iraq alone). Thus, foreign aid has proven to be crucial in assisting these

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55 [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/how-is-islamic-state-funded/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/how-is-islamic-state-funded/)


57 [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/how-is-islamic-state-funded/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/how-is-islamic-state-funded/)

refugees and supporting populations whose lives have been destroyed by ISIS. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has undertaken several efforts within this region to assist those displaced, but more could be done in this realm as well.

Finally, with the massive influx of foreign aid to the conflict, the Security Council should suggest enforcement mechanisms that can prevent aid from falling into the wrong hands. Though trusted aid organizations have made great strides in this issue, a unifying strategy from the Security Council would go a long way towards instilling confidence in international parties with regards to aid delivery to affected populations in Iraq and Syria.