



PMUNC 2015

Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USA

Chair: Seamus Daniels

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Chair's Letter

Dear Delegates,

Hello! My name is Seamus Daniels and I will be your chair for the USA section of the Cuban Missile Crisis Joint Crisis Committee. First a little about myself: I hail from Albany, the great capital of the Empire State of New York. I'm a huge fan of Manchester United Football Club and the TV show Archer. At Princeton, I am a senior in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and am pursuing a Certificate in Near Eastern Studies. On campus, I served as Secretary-General for PMUNC 2014, and am also a member of the Princeton Tower Club and the Princeton Men's Club Soccer Team.

I'm very excited to be one of the chairs for this year's JCC on the Cuban Missile Crisis. It's an event that we all learn about in our US History textbooks, but we often forget why the conflict still captivates the public imagination: it could have easily turned out very differently. Depending on how the Americans, Soviets, and Cubans reacted, the Cuban Missile Crisis could easily have resulted in nuclear war. Simulating this committee will allow us to consider the "what-ifs"—in other words, how history might have played out in an alternative universe. I urge you to consider these alternate possibilities, and look forward to seeing how our committee plays out at the conference!

All the best,
Seamus Daniels

JCC: USA

U.S. Policy in the Cold War

The date is January 20, 1961. The U.S. is currently embroiled in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, a struggle for global influence and domination. It's not only a conflict between two superpowers; it's a battle of ideologies. Capitalism versus Communism. The world is divided into two spheres of influence, the allies of the United States and the West, and the satellite states of the Soviet Union.

George Kennan, the Deputy Chief of the Mission of the United States to the U.S.S.R., outlines the struggle in the following excerpt from his 1946 "Long Telegram":

“In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no

permanent *modus vivendi* that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in

history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic

problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict..”¹

The current U.S. strategy in the Cold War is one of *containment*. In his 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conflict,” Kennan wrote “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”² To that end, the U.S. needs to stand firm and counter any potential expansion to the Soviet sphere of influence.

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<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>

² <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct>

The U.S. and Cuba

On January 1, 1959, the Cuban Revolution forced President Fulgencio Batista and his U.S.-backed regime from power. Batista controlled an authoritarian state, seizing power in a coup in 1952. The U.S. had a long relationship with Cuba since the Spanish-American War in 1898. Cuba became independent in 1902, though the U.S. reserved the right to intervene in its internal affairs. By 1958, however, the U.S. ceased providing military aid to the Batista regime.³

Following Batista's ousting, government control was taken over by the leader of the rebel forces, Fidel Castro. At this point, it is unclear as to the status of the Cuban government under Castro; it has not declared itself as communist as of yet.

³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1203355.stm>

The U.S.S.R., however, recognized the new government on May 7, 1960 and appeared to be pushing the Caribbean nation into its sphere of influence.⁴

These fears were confirmed on December 19, 1960 when Cuba and the U.S.S.R. aligned itself with the Soviet state following the establishment of trade relations and the distribution of economic credit.⁵

Following the nationalization of all American property in Cuba in 1960,⁶ the U.S. to end diplomatic relations with Cuba and to close its embassy in Havana on January 3, 1961.⁷

⁴ <http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/timeline/>

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1203355.stm>

⁷ <http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/timeline/>

ExComm must determine U.S. policy on Cuba. A nation so closely aligned with the Soviet Union just below the Southern coastline poses serious national security concerns. Cuba cannot become a base for Soviet arms and missiles. Such a location would place major American cities including the capital in range.

Additionally, Cuba cannot become a hub for further communist expansion in Central and Latin America. Cuba poses enough of a threat on American national security for the entire region to be exposed to Soviet influence.

This committee must decide the next steps to take in addressing the threat of Cuba. Should our government adopt a hardline that threatens escalating the conflict?

Other Policy Challenges

External Challenges

Germany

Though the Allies agreed in principle to an eventual unified German state after the end of World War II, in 1949 the Soviet Union declared that the zone of Germany it was occupying would be a fully independent "German Democratic Republic" (GDR, or German *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* DDR). In response, the United States, the UK, and France merged their three zones and declared the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or German *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* BRD). Colloquially, these Germanys are known as East and West Germany, respectively.

At any moment there are roughly 50,000 soldiers on either side of the Inner

German border, including troops from both Germanys and from their state sponsors. For the first decade or so of East and West German history, the USSR had held the advantage in numbers of conventional troops and ground forces along this border and along other borders in Europe. The only thing that has kept them at bay has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. Unclassified estimations indicate that the United States may have several hundred nuclear weapons stationed in West Germany, deliverable either by bomber or by missile. These weapons remain under American lock and key; the Germans themselves have no say in their use.

Quality of life in West Germany remains somewhat below US quality, since Germany suffered more during the Second World War, but quality of life in East Germany is far lower. The Soviets and their proxy German Communist Party

seem incapable of administering the territory as efficiently as the West Germans. At the end of World War II, the Soviets also stripped East Germany of any capital (e.g. machinery) and wealth they could find; this impeded East German economic growth.

As a result of this huge disparity, East Germany is particularly vulnerable to Western propaganda. The United States has been broadcasting Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty into East Germany from the West German border and from West Berlin (see below), as well as from some ships.

Ultimately, the US and allies' goal is a fully sovereign unified German state.

Unfortunately, we don't expect the Soviets to agree to this anytime soon. In the meantime, we aim to maintain the current status quo, while minimizing the risk of

direct conflict between the two major Cold War powers.

Berlin

Currently, Berlin is divided into four sections, each occupied by one of the major European powers: the UK, the USA, the USSR, and France. The Soviets have used the Berliners (located deep in East Germany) as hostages before. The USSR cut off all traffic, including food and fuel, from West Germany into West Berlin in the spring of 1948. In response, the US and allies airlifted supplies into West Berlin for more than a year until the Soviets gave up the blockade, a major propaganda victory for the US.

According to West German law, all Germans (East and West) are entitled to full citizenship rights in West Germany. These rights and the economic disparity

are a huge incentive to East Germans to flee to the West; large numbers have been doing so over the last decade. The easiest route for this is from East Berlin to West Berlin. The Soviets are not impressed by this. Berlin remains the largest hole in their Iron Curtain. There is still time for diplomacy, but Berlin remains a potential flashpoint that could make this Cold War hot.

Turkey

The Turkish Republic has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1955, when it joined simultaneously with Greece. Turkey is also the home of NATO's İncirlik air force base, a major factor in US power projection into the region. Since 1955, Turkey has also been a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a less functional mutual defense alliance between the UK, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. Turkey

contributed forces to the UN (US) mission in Korea during the Korean War.

Geostrategically, Turkey's position is probably the single most critical of any NATO ally. US intelligence forces are openly able to watch Soviet and Soviet-aligned war ships move from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, straits Turkey controls. News stories have asserted that NATO is even tracking Soviet nuclear submarines as they attempt to travel covertly through the straits. Turkey is also one of only two NATO members that share a direct land border with the USSR (the other being Norway), in the Caucasus with the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR.

As of 1959, the US placed Jupiter-class missiles with nuclear warheads on Turkish soil. These weapons remain in the custody of the United States. The weapons were

placed in order to assuage Turkish fear of conventional or unconventional Soviet attack on their land.

Tensions also occasionally flare between Greece and Turkey, two countries that have been rivals more than friends for more than a century. Both are NATO members today, but fighting within the NATO bloc could tear the entire alliance structure apart. The US cannot really afford to lose either member.

Turkey is nominally a democracy, but for the first two decades of its history it was a one-party state. From 1946 until 1960, there were free multi-party elections with a peaceful transfer of power between opposing parties, until in May 1960 General Cemal Gürsel lead a coup against the democratically elected President and Prime Minister. Turkey currently remains under authoritarian military rule. Aside from its oscillation between democracy

and military rule, the Turkish government remains staunchly secular and Capitalist.

Internal Challenges

Space Race

The USSR launched Sputnik 1 (СПУТНИК-1) into orbit around our planet on October 4, 1957. In response, we attempted to launch our own satellite, Vanguard, in December of that year. Vanguard failed to launch and experienced a catastrophic failure (explosion) on the launchpad, embarrassing our country worldwide. At the end of January, 1958, we successfully launched Explorer 1, the first American satellite.

The Soviets have continued their rocket testing, recently having sent dogs in capsules into space. The dogs have not survived reentry. Our own space program,

administered by the newly organized NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) has focused more on mice, monkeys, and apes, but their survival rate is far from acceptable for human cargo.

The so-called “Space Race” is a propaganda battle between the West and the East in the context of the greater Cold War. It is a challenge to see which side can better pursue technological advancement and explore the universe. It is also a not-so-subtle way for each side to make veiled threats: the same technology that put Sputnik 1 and Explorer 1 into space could just as easily be used to launch a nuclear weapon at the enemy, even across the planet. The Space Race is producing technology with military use, most obviously in the form of missiles but also in other ways.

The Space Race is also extremely expensive. Critics of the space program are fairly rare because of the immense propaganda value of the launches, but most criticism centers around claims that the money spent on NASA could fund more effective propaganda.

Finally, there is the question of the militarization of space. Right now we are not capable of putting serious weapons into Earth's orbit, but policymakers have quietly proposed such radical ideas as a US military base on the surface of the Moon. These proposals are far off, but our advisors say that using satellites to gather intelligence on the enemy is a possibility within this (or at least by the end of the next) Presidential term.

Currently Soviet space technology is superior to ours. Right now, if we are capable of developing any sort of space weapon, you can be sure that the Soviets

have already made a prototype. Thus, we must prepare for the future of warfare not just to defeat the enemy, but also in order to ensure our own survival.

Risk of Communist Infiltration

Though former Senator Joseph McCarthy ended up making a fool of himself on national television in his zeal, he wasn't entirely wrong. We believe that there are Communists and sympathizers at various levels of the federal government, and of course in state and local governments. Senator McCarthy was on the right track when he investigated, in particular, the State Department, though his specifics were lacking. It is unclear whether these radicals are homegrown and unaffiliated with the Soviet Union, or whether they are taking orders from the Politburo itself. We must be wary about whose advice to trust. Our very inner circles may be breached.

Aside from infiltration into government, we believe that the Reds and their sympathizers are filling the media with unpatriotic propaganda, and doing the work of the enemy. Hollywood is known to be full of Reds. America's free media is at once our strength and our weakness: it's public knowledge that the media is independent from the state, but this means it is vulnerable to unpatriotic infiltration.

Further, after having surveilled major labor unions, we believe that many of them are also compromised by Communists. They have been organizing among the poor in the South, as well as in the major unions. The FBI recommends further surveillance and possible direct action against these domestic enemies before they more seriously harm our country.

Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm)

ExComm was a council of U.S. officials convened by President Kennedy to address the threat posed by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Committee consisted of members of the National Security Council as well as individuals consulted by JFK. For the sake of the committee, some historical members of ExComm have been excluded while other actors not originally in the council have been included.

*Robert Francis Kennedy, Attorney General-
Committee Director*

“The President's younger brother and most trusted adviser believed doing nothing about the Soviet

missiles in Cuba was “unthinkable”, while a surprise air strike, in light of the memory of Pearl Harbor, was against America’s traditions and would “blacken the name of the United States in the pages of history”. He therefore favored the blockade as an action that would “make known unmistakably the seriousness of U.S. determination to get the missiles out of Cuba” while leaving the Soviets “some room for maneuver to pull back”. At the height of the crisis, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and made explicit the threat of an imminent U.S. attack, while also delivering the President’s secret promise to withdraw U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey in four to five months. He later wrote an

acclaimed account of the crisis, *Thirteen Days.*⁸

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President

Prior to joining the Kennedy Administration, LBJ served as the Senator from Texas from 1949-1961 and Senate Majority Leader from 1955-1961. After losing the Democratic nomination in the 1960 presidential election, he was chosen to be the running partner of JFK. During the crisis, he “sided with those in favor of a strike and advised the president unsuccessfully against conferring with congressmen and U.S. allies on ways to resolve the crisis, as Johnson believed they would provide little help.”⁹ Johnson would assume the Presidency

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

following JFK's assassination in 1963.

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

David Dean Rusk was originally JFK's second choice for the position of Secretary of State after J. William Fulbright, but was nevertheless nominated and approved in 1961. "Rusk asserted that the Secretary of State served at the pleasure of the President.

As such, the Secretary's role reflected that of an advisor who would preside over policy debates, offer informed views, and endorse the President's decisions.

Rusk also advocated a "dignified diplomacy," emphasizing civility and communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rusk's diplomatic

orientation and his ability to evaluate and judge competing points of view defused tensions during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and contributed toward the successful negotiation of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963."¹⁰ Rusk would go on to serve as Secretary of State until 1969, tied for the second-longest serving Secretary of State.

Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense

JFK offered the position of Secretary of Defense to Robert McNamara on the recommendation of former Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett.

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<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/rusk-david-dean>

“During the Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara viewed the Soviet deployment as a political issue, not one affecting the overall nuclear balance. He first raised for consideration the option of a blockade on October 16. A persuasive advocate for the blockade, McNamara believed it was important to keep all options on the table and leave the door open to negotiations, rather than issue an ultimatum that the U.S. would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were not removed. He feared that any sudden military move could provoke a response from the Soviets that could trigger a nuclear war.”¹¹

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹¹ <http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

A veteran of World War II and the Korean War, Taylor served as Army Chief of Staff under the Eisenhower Administration. He would resign and retire from active service, however, in 1959 after falling into conflict with the Administration over its doctrine of massive retaliation. Taylor preferred a military policy based on a “flexible response” to the doctrine espoused by Eisenhower.

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JFK persuaded Taylor to return to active service and named him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1962.¹³ During the Cuban Missile Crisis, “Taylor joined with other hardliners in advocating a surprise military air strike. However, he

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<http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/21/obituaries/maxwell-d-taylor-soldier-and-envoy-dies.html?pagewanted=3>

¹³ Ibid.

had his doubts about getting “our feet in that deep mud of Cuba” and believed a costly invasion should be a last resort.”¹⁴

John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence

“After the Bay of Pigs, John McCone replaced Allen Dulles as CIA Director. McCone foresaw the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba and ordered the U-2 flights on October 14 that discovered them. He took a hard line during the crisis. However, he thought a surprise attack on Cuba would force the U.S. to live with a “Pearl Harbor indictment”. Therefore, he argued that before an air strike, Castro and Khrushchev should be given warning and 24 hours to begin dismantling and removing the

missiles. McCone believed a blockade would not be sufficient to resolve the crisis, as it would allow a long drawn-out period during which the Cubans could launch the missiles against the U.S.”¹⁵

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Ambassador at Large for Soviet Affairs

“Former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, with extensive knowledge of the Soviet Union, its language, history and culture, Thompson was described by Dean Rusk as “our in-house Russian during the missile crisis”. He supported the blockade and urged the President to accompany it with a demand that Khrushchev dismantle the weapons in Cuba. Thompson believed that in the

¹⁴

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

¹⁵

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

end the blockade-ultimatum approach would probably still lead to a strike. However, “we do it in an entirely different posture and background and much less danger of getting up into the big war.” Thompson also influenced the President’s decision to respond to Khrushchev’s first, private, more conciliatory letter of October 26, ignoring the second, public, more aggressive statement, which raised the issue of a Turkey-Cuba trade. Thompson argued strongly against accepting such a bargain, which he believed would involve trading not just missiles for missiles, but everything from planes to technicians, leading to the effective abandonment of the U.S. base in Turkey. He suggested that the first letter Khrushchev had written himself and sent out without clearance, while the

second, public statement was likely dictated by Politburo hardliners. Thompson argued that Khrushchev needed something he could use to save face: “The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say ‘I saved Cuba; I stopped an invasion.’ And he can get away with this, if he wants to, and he’s had a go at this Turkey thing, and that we’ll discuss later.”¹⁶

McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor

“In 1953, at the age of 34, Bundy became the youngest ever dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences, before serving as National Security Adviser from 1961 to 1966. During the Cuban Missile Crisis Bundy encouraged the President to consider all

¹⁶

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

possible courses of action and sometimes played devil's advocate or changed his mind. For example, Bundy made the case for doing nothing about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. On October 18 he argued that "we would be better off to merely take note of the existence of these missiles, and to wait until the crunch comes in Berlin". The next day he changed his mind and favored decisive action – a surprise air strike, as the blockade would not be enough to remove the missiles from Cuba."¹⁷

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury

Although a member of the Republican party, JFK selected C. Douglas Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury in 1961. "Dillon took a hard line during the Cuban Missile

Crisis. Initially he favored a military strike but later, along with Thompson, Dillon proposed to begin with the blockade, refuse negotiations, demand removal of the missiles, and threaten further military action. Dillon argued that the President had to show his firm intentions to the Russians and not look as if he were backing down. He first suggested the idea of using the blockade as a way to present the Soviets with an ultimatum to remove the missiles or face military action."¹⁸

Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel

"The President's chief speechwriter and close confidant, Sorensen advocated a naval blockade as the best first response to the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

¹⁸

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

Along with McNamara, he believed the blockade could only freeze the status quo and open the door to negotiations. While it would put a halt to further shipments of missiles, the blockade would not force the Soviets to remove the missiles already in place in Cuba. Sorensen carefully drafted Kennedy's speech to the nation announcing the blockade and letters to Khrushchev, knowing that "anything that angered or soured Khrushchev could result in the end of America, maybe the end of the world."¹⁹

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense

"A graduate of Yale, with a background in law,"²⁰ Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1964 after serving as Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary of the Air Force.²¹ "During the missile crisis, Gilpatric opposed the military strike option and supported the blockade. In a crucial meeting on October 20, as President Kennedy weighed the two options, Gilpatric summed up the arguments: "Essentially, Mr. President, this is a choice between limited action and unlimited action, and most of us think that it's better to start with limited action."²²

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

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<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/17/us/roswell-gilpatric-lawyer-and-kennedy-aide-dies-at-89.html>

²²

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

*Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs*

Edwin Martin served as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1962-1964. "An expert on economics, he was appointed to the inter-American affairs post in March 1962. In choosing him, the Kennedy administration was seen as moving to reinforce the Alliance for Progress, a United States aid program for Latin America. But by late April 1962, the indications were that he had become the closest thing to an overall "boss" of Latin American policy that the Kennedy administration had had. Before the missile crisis began, he coordinated American endeavors to cut Cuba off from other Western Hemisphere governments. In addition, he said

in an interview in August 1962: "We want to get rid of Castro and the Soviet Communist influence in Cuba -- not just Castro. I think the Soviet Communist influence is more serious than Castro."²³ "During the missile crisis, he favored the blockade option and helped to brief members of the Organization of American States (OAS) to obtain their backing for it."²⁴

Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense

"Paul Nitze had famously drafted National Security Council memo NSC-68 in 1950, which helped shape U.S. policy during the Cold War, by calling for a substantial increase in military spending and

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<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/world/edwin-martin-93-a-voice-in-60-s-latin-america-policy.html>

²⁴

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

“a rapid build-up of the political, economic, and military strength in the free world” to contain the Soviet threat. As Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nitze was among the hawkish members of ExComm, urging an immediate military strike, as he believed the Soviet missiles in Cuba dramatically altered the strategic nuclear balance.”²⁵

George Ball, Under Secretary of State

“Under Secretary of State from 1961 to 1966, George Ball was active at the State Department in implementing the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. During the Cuban crisis he opposed the idea of a surprise air strike, like many others offering the analogy to

Pearl Harbor, and favored instead the blockade option, which would give time to the Soviets to reflect and consider backing down. Ball later advised against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.”²⁶

General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force

“With a distinguished military career, Curtis LeMay had commanded the 305th Bomb Group during WWII, pioneered many bomber flying formations, overseen the Berlin Airlift, and headed the Strategic Air Command, before becoming Air Force Chief of Staff in 1961. During the Cuban crisis, General LeMay emerged as a strong opponent of the blockade option.

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/excomm/>

He believed there was no choice but immediate direct military action, and warned that the first thing the Soviets would do after the announcement of the blockade would be to hide the missiles. He thought the blockade would ultimately lead to war, and warned the President, “We’re just going to gradually drift into war under conditions that are at great disadvantage to us...This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.”²⁷

Adlai Stevenson II, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

“Adlai Stevenson was Governor of Illinois, a Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956, and served as Ambassador to the United Nations from 1961

to 1965. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Stevenson came to Washington and joined a few of the White House sessions. He urged moderation and a diplomatic approach, instead of an air strike. Stevenson’s “finest hour” was the October 25 debate at the United Nations, during which he confronted Soviet UN representative Valerian Zorin with photographic evidence and aggressively demanded that he admit the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba.”²⁸

Admiral George Whelan Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations

A navigator on the *USS Yorktown* in the Pacific during the Second World War, George W. Anderson was Chief of Naval Operations at

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<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/us-players/>

²⁸

<http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/dramatis-personae/us-players/>

the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As such, he was responsible for the U.S. blockade of Cuba during the crisis. "President Kennedy was quoted as telling Mr. Anderson, "Well, Admiral it looks as though this is up to the Navy," to which he replied, "Mr. President, the Navy will not let you down." Time magazine featured him on its cover, calling him "an aggressive blue-water sailor of unfaltering competence and uncommon flare."²⁹ A feud with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara led to his replacement as CNO in 1963, but he would be appointed as the Ambassador to Portugal by JFK shortly after.³⁰

William Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor

Secretary William Willard Wirtz assumed office on December 15, 1960 after Arthur J. Goldberg unexpectedly resigned for personal reasons. An eloquent speaker and a gifted mediator, he wrote speeches for Adlai Stevenson during his 1952 Presidential campaign; Wirtz is also an active Democrat who many view as an "icon of liberalism."³¹ In fact, he has frequently spoken fervently and emotionally in interviews about the "deplorable" situation surrounding underprivileged groups in the United States at this time.³²

Chosen for his experience on the War Labor Board and National Wage Stabilization Board, he

²⁹<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/22/us/adm-george-w-anderson-85-was-in-charge-of-cuba-blockade.html>

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/24/AR2010042402358.html>

³² Ibid

hopes to focus his time as secretary alleviating the struggles of the unemployed, the poor, and victims of discrimination.³³ However, since organized labor is quite strong in the country at this time, it is unclear whether Wirtz will be able to maintain this emphasis during a time of worker unrest.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health and Education

Before taking office as Secretary of Health and Education, Anthony J. Celebrezze served as Cleveland's first elected mayor for five consecutive terms.³⁴ Kennedy had actually previously offered a federal judgeship to Celebrezze, but he turned the position down to serve a fifth term in

Cleveland.³⁵ During those five terms, he was the driving force behind the city's urban renewal program and has been described as a "visionary" and "honest politician" for his hardworking personality.³⁶ Now, as Secretary of Health and Education, Celebrezze has displayed this same passion towards various social issues such as civil rights, welfare, and child health.

³³<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/26wirtz.html>

³⁴http://law.onu.edu/about/notable_alumni/anthony_j_celebrezze

³⁵<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/31/us/anthony-celebrezze-is-dead-kennedy-cabinet-member-88.html>

³⁶ Ibid

